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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether plaintiffs, former public employees who were 
disqualified from participation in the Utah State Retirement 
System when their public employer was sold to a private 
corporation, may recover the pension fund contributions previously 
paid on their behalf by their public employer. 
2. Whether the termination and forfeiture provisions of 
the Utah State Retirement Act, particularly Utah Code Ann, 
S 49-10-24, strictly limit plaintiffs1 rights against the Utah 
State Retirement System and preclude an equitable action for 
restitution of their employer contributions. 
STATUTE SUBJECT TO INTERPRETATION 
Utah Code Ann, §49-10-24? 
Options of terminating employee — Withdrawal of 
accumulated contributions — Inactive membership. If a member 
shall for any cause, except retirement, permanent or temporary 
disability or death, cease to be employed in covered services 
for an employer he may: 
(a) By written request directed to the 
retirement office receive a refund of all his accumulated 
contributions, less a withdrawal fee the amount of which 
the retirement board shall establish by regulation for 
the purpose of reimbursing its administrative fund for 
the cost entailed by said withdrawal. In the event of 
such election, a terminating employee upon later 
re-employemnt by an employer under the provisions of this 
act, unless he redeposits his refund as herein permitted, 
shall be treated as a new employee and his service 
history and benefit rights shall then be based upon 
current services from the date of said re-employment in 
covered services. 
-1-
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(b) Leave his account in the fund intact. In 
the event of such election, a terminating employee shall 
retain status as a member of the system, excepting for 
the lack of contributions paid into the fund by him or on 
his behalf. In the event of his re-employment by an 
employer for services covered by this act, his service 
history and benefit rights shall be based upon the prior 
service credit and current service credit accredited to 
him at the time of his most recent termination of 
employment, as well as upon the current service credit 
that he acquires as the result of his re-employment. 
Upon the attainment of retirement age, an inactive 
member shall have the same rights to receive retirement 
benefits, if eligible therefor, as any active employee member. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from an order of Judge James S. Sawaya of 
the Third Judicial District Court denying plaintiffs1 motion for 
parital summary judgment and granting defendant's oral cross 
motion for summary judgment, no cause of action. Plaintiffs-
Appellants1 motion sought a declaration that Utah Code Ann. 
§49-10-24 is inapplicable to plaintiffs as a matter of law, and an 
order that the defendant Utah State Retirement Office return to 
plaintiffs the employer contributions paid on their behalf by 
their former employer. 
Plaintiffs1 public employer, Payson City Hospital, was 
sold to a private corporation, rendering the Hospital and 
plaintiffs ineligible to continue participating in the Retirement 
System. Plaintiffs1 demand for restitution of their employer 
contributions was denied by the Retirement Office because 
defendant classified plaintiffs as "terminating employees" under 
Utah Code Ann. §49-10-24. Plaintiffs contend that statute was 
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Statement of Proceedings For Which No Transcript Was Made, 
(Record at ; reproduced in Addendum.) On February 8, 1985, the 
district court granted defendant's motion and denied plaintiffs1 
motion (record at 357). Plaintiffs1 timely Notice of Appeal was 
filed on March 8, 1985 (record at 365). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I. PRELIMINARY FACTUAL STATEMENT 
A. The Statutory Framework of the Utah State 
Retirement System. 
The Utah State Retirement Act ("Act"), Utah Code Ann. 
S 49-10-1 et. seq., was passed in 1967 to establish the 
most recent version of a succession of public employee retirement 
systems. See e.g., Utah Code Ann. S 49-10-3. The Act 
is administered by the Utah State Retirement Board through the 
respondent Utah State Retirement Office. Utah Code Ann. 
S 49-10-1. 
The express purpose of the 1967 Act was to terminate and 
consolidate the old school employees' and public employees1 
retirement systems; to provide a uniform system of membership, 
retirement requirements, and contributions and benefits for publi 
employees and their employers; and to enable employees to provide 
for themselves and their dependents in the case of old age, 
disability and death. Utah Code Ann. SS 49-10-2, 49-10-3. 
All employing units participating in the terminated 
systems, including Payson City Hospital, were automatically 
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Although the Retirement Office provided assistance to the 
Utah Legislature before passage of the 1967 Act, no mention was 
made that an employer unit might withdraw from the Retirement 
System. Deposition of Burt Hunsaker at 33:19 to 34:23. 
Prior to passage of the current Act in 1967, no employing 
unit had ever withdrawn from the retirement system. Deposition of 
Burt Hunsaker at 33:10-13. 
The only withdrawals that occurred between 1967 and 1983 
involved (1) a few small cities with a couple of employees who 
changed to ineligible part-time or elected positions, and (2) two 
or three small cities' hospitals, such as Payson City Hospital, 
that were sold around 1977. Deposition of Burt Hunsaker at 32:8 
to 33:9. 
Prior to 1983, the Act made no provision for employer 
unit withdrawals. Deposition of Burt Hunsaker at 66:13-18; 
Utah Code Ann. S 49-10-11 (amended 1983, 1984). See also 
City of West Jordan v. Utah State Retirement Office, Civ. No. 
C82-6157, Memorandum Decision at 5 (3d Jud. Dist. Ct. Utah Jan. 
17, 1983) (record at 211).I7 
hJ City of West Jordan involved the city's 
attempt to withdraw while it was still a political subdivision. 
The court held that the city could not withdraw because the Act 
made no provision for withdrawal. In the present case, however, 
defendant admits that Payson City Hospital did in fact withdraw as 
a result of its divestiture to a private entity. Deposition of 
Burt Hunsaker at 32:20-22. See also footnote 4, infra. 
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contributions and the Hospital paid its required matching 
contributions. 
On or about October 1, 1977, Payson City sold the 
Hospital to a private entity. The decision to sell was made by 
Payson City and not by the plaintiffs. The sale was made with the 
approval of the Utah Department of State Planning. 
Upon the sale, plaintiffs were not fired, nor did they 
quit, change jobs, or otherwise cease to be employed by the 
Hospital. 
Because of the sale of the Hospital, the Retirement 
Office, through its Executive Director, Mr. Burt Hunsaker, was 
obliged to interpret the Act to determine the status of the 
appellants. Deposition of Burt Hunsaker at 54:24 to 55:4. 
Mr. Hunsaker looked to the Act, particularly § 49-10-24, 
which sets forth the options of a "terminating" employee. 
Deposition of Bert Hunsaker at 54:5-15 and 56:17 to 57:4. That 
statute provides that a member who, except for retirement, 
disability or death ceases to be employed in "covered services" 
may: (1) withdraw his accumulated employee contributions, or (2) 
leave his account in the Fund intact and receive deferred 
retirement benefits based on service to date when he reaches 
retirement age. Utah Code Ann. S 49-10-24. 
Mr. Hunsaker determined that the Act did not distinguish 
between individual terminations of employees and the departure of 
an entire employer unit. Deposition of Burt Hunsaker at 55:5-10. 
That interpretation was based on Mr. Hunsaker1s underlying 
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interpretation that there was no provision in the Act for an 
employing unit's withdrawal, Ld. at 66:13-18. Thus, Mr. 
Hunsaker determined that plaintiffs were limited to the options in 
S 49-10-24, even though they continued to perform their same jobs 
for the same hospital. 
After the Retirement Office determined that Utah 
Code Ann. § 49-10-24 governed plaintiffs' rights, 
approximately 106 hospital employees with less than four years of 
service were required to forfeit all retirement fund benefits 
arising from employer contributions paid by the Hospital on their 
behalf. Another group of approximately 59 employees — those with 
over four years of service — had to choose one of the two options 
in S 49-10-24. Of the 59, about 43 chose the first option (a 
refund of employee contributions), resulting in their forfeiture 
of rights and benefits deriving from the Hospital's contributions 
on their behalf; approximately 10 chose the second option and left 
their employee contributions in the System; 6 chose early 
retirement. 
By the time the Hospital was sold, it had paid 
substantial employer contributions on behalf of plaintiffs. 
Determination of the amount of employer contributions was reserved 
for trial in plaintiffs1 motion. 
II. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS SUPPORTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The material facts relied upon by plaintiffs in their 
motion for partial summary judgment are set forth below. Those 
-9-
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facts were not disputed by the defendant in its memorandum in 
opposition or at the hearing, (Statement of Proceedings In Which 
No Transcript Was Made, record at ). The court below found no 
genuine issue of material fact (record at 357). 
1. Payson City Hospital joined the public employees 
retirement system in 1961 and automatically became a participating 
employer in the current Utah State Retirement System when enacted 
in 1967. 
2. As employees of a participating employer, plaintiffs 
were required to become, and did become, members of the Utah State 
Retirement System. 
3. Plaintiffs paid their required employee contributions 
under the Retirement System to the defendant. 
4. The Hospital paid its mandatory matching employer 
contributions on plaintiffs1 behalf to the defendant. 
5. In 1977, the Hospital was sold by Payson City to a 
private entity, the Hospital Corporation of America. 
6. Upon the sale, plaintiffs continued in their former 
jobs and did not quit, retire, change jobs, or otherwise cease 
working for the Hospital. 
7. Plaintiffs took no part in Payson City's decision to 
sell the Hospital. 
8. Plaintiffs sought a refund of their employer 
contributions from the Retirement Office, arguing that the 
termination and forfeiture provisions of the Act did not apply to 
them as a class of involuntarily and suddenly disqualified 
employees. -10-
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9. The Retirement Office determined that plaintiffs were 
"terminating employees" under Utah Code Ann, § 49-10-24. The 
Retirement Office interpreted § 49-10-24 to govern regardless of 
whether plaintiffs were terminated as individuals or disqualified 
as a class. 
10. Because plaintiffs were treated as "terminating 
employees/1 approximately 106 employees with less than four years 
of credited service received a refund of their employee 
contributionsf but were required to forfeit all benefits under the 
Utah State Retirement System, including employer contributions 
paid on their behalf. 
11. Another group of approximately 59 employees had over 
four years of service and had to choose one of the options under 
S 49-10-24: about 43 chose the first option, withdrawing their 
employee contributions and forfeiting all rights and benefits 
derived from employer contributions paid on their behalf; about 10 
chose the second option, leaving their employee contributions in 
the Retirement Fund; and about 6 chose early retirement. 
12. Plaintiffs appealed the Utah State Retirement 
Board's determination that S 49-10-24 governs plaintiffs' rights 
to the Third District Court, 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs1 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment sought a 
declaration that the termination provisions of the Actf including 
S 49-10-24, do not apply to plaintiffs and sought restitution of 
the employer contributions paid on their behalf by Payson City 
Hospital to the Utah State Retirement Fund, The motion reserved 
determination of the amount of recovery for trial. On all legal 
issues, the analysis in support of plaintiffs' motion is the same 
as the analysis in opposition to defendant's motion. 
This Court's decisions, acts of the Utah Legislature, and 
basic labor economics establish that plaintiffs' employer 
contributions are part of their employment compensation in the 
form of "deferred wages." Plaintiffs have a legally protectable 
interest in their employer contributions (deferred wages), even 
before attaining vested benefits. 
Plaintiffs' rights to enjoy their deferred wages would 
normally be predicated on satisfying the statutory vesting 
schedule. However, cases such as this one have shown that events 
outside the contemplation of the retirement plan may frustrate or 
render impossible satisfying those vesting requirements. The best 
reasoned decisions from courts faced with this problem hold that 
employee groups suffering unanticipated mass discharge have an 
immediate equitable claim for restitution of their deferred 
wages. This restitution is necessary to prevent an unjustified 
windfall to the retirement system caused by employee forfeitures 
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that were beyond the plan's actuarial assumptions and outside the 
scope of the participants' assumed risks. 
Before this case arose, the Utah State Retirement System 
never contemplated the divestitute of a participating employer 
unit and the consequent mass disqualification of an entire 
workforce. There was no historical experience in Utah to prompt 
legislature consideration of this problem and, in fact, no 
legislative discussion of this phenomenon is known to have 
occurred. 
The Retirement Office's application of the Act's 
termination provisions to plaintiffs, disqualified from 
participation in the Retirement System for reasons beyond their 
control, worked a gross and inequitable forfeiture to the unjust 
enrichment of the Retirement System. As a matter of law, 
therefore, plaintiffs are entitled to restitution of the employer 
contributions paid on their behalf. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS' EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTIONS WERE COMPENSATION FOR 
PLAINTIFFS' SERVICES IN THE FORM OF "DEFERRED WAGES." " 
Pension plans were originally perceived as gratuitous, 
bestowing no enforceable rights on participating employees or 
retirees. See generally, Bernstein, Employee Pension 
Rights When Plants Shut Down, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 952, 959 (1963) 
(record at 222). Utah, however, long ago joined the modern view 
that "the right to a pension becomes as much a part of the agreed 
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compensation for the services of the employee as the monthly 
stipend, but it is deferred in payment until after his 
retirement." Newcombe v. Ogden City Public School Teachers 
Retirement Commission, 121 Utah 503, 243 P.2d 941, 943 (1952). 
The theory for viewing employer pension contributions as 
"deferred wages" is well-founded: 
Unions demand increases of X cents per hour in money wages and 
Y cents per hour in fringe benefits, including pension plan 
contributions. Employers respond with counteroffers [and] 
. . . [factfinding boards report bargaining proposals of both 
in the same fashion. The bargaining of large unions and large 
employers is most explicit on this point because both sides 
have the technical assistance to translate fringe costs, 
including pension plan contributions, into costs per 
hour . . . . 
Not infrequently ununionized employers are "following" the 
pattern set by the unionized sector as a means of competing 
for employees . . . . [Ajs a general proposition, unbargained 
plans seem no less a part of employee compensation than 
bargained plans . . . . 
The demand to bargain did not turn the contributions and 
pension plan into "wages"; rather, it was the nature of the 
inducement by the company to the employees and the value of 
the contributions and the benefits to the employees which 
made them "wages". 
Bernstein, 76 Harv. L. Rev. at 960, 961 (emphasis added). 
Under Utah's Retirement System the proportion of 
contributions paid by employees and employers is the subject of 
negotiation at the legislative level. For example, participating 
public employers contribute more than employees in the Public 
Safety Retirement System, the Firemen Retirement System, and the 
Judges Retirement System; but employer and employee contributions 
are equal in the public employees1 Utah State Retirement System. 
Deposition of Burt Hunsaker at 43, 44. The basis for the 
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discrepancy between the retirement funds is "[negotiation by the 
individual groups when establishing a program. The law being an 
effort at the legislature, a compromise between employer and 
employees." Id. The fact that the various funds' proportions 
of employer to employee contribution rates is subject to 
negotiation confirms the fact that all contributions are truly 
part of an employee's total compensation. 
The fact that pension contributions are deferred wages is 
further manifested by the State Department of Personnel's biennial 
comparisons of state and private compensation for similar jobs. 
Utah Code Ann. S 67-19-12. Included in the studies are three 
categories: take-home pay, fringe benefits including pension 
values, and a composite of money and fringe benefits. Although 
take-home wages for some positions differ between the public and 
private sectors, it is the composite figure which the Legislature 
attempts to equalize. Section 67-19-12(3) defines "total 
compensation" for purposes of the salary survey to "include but 
not be limited to salaries and wages, bonuses . . . retirement 
and all other fringe benefits that are or may be offered to 
state employees as inducements to work for the state." 
(Emphasis added). See also Utah Code Ann. 
S 67-19-12(2)(f). 
The deferred compensation characteristic of employer 
contributions is conclusively demonstrated by the history of 
Utah's retirement system. In 1951, the Utah Legislature voted to 
repeal the State retirement system in order to join the Social 
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Security System. Provision was made for employees with less than 
ten years service to receive back the present value of both 
their employee and employer contributions in the form of a 
paid-up annuity. Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement 
System Board of Administration, 122 Utah 44, 53, 57, 246 P.2d 
591, 595, 597 (1952) (record at 252). 
The Utah Legislature has historically viewed employer and 
employee retirement contributions as equally compensatory in 
nature and intent. See also Driggs v. Utah State Teachers 
Retirement Board, 105 Utah 417, 142 P.2d 657 (1943) (refusing 
to distinguish between pension benefits funded solely by the 
employee, and benefits funded by the state, or both the state and 
employee). It is clear, therefore, that plaintiffs' employer 
contributions were compensation in the form of deferred wages. 
Plaintiffs have legally enforcible interests in their deferred 
wages, even if plaintiffs' pension rights are not "vested." 
II. PLAINTIFFS HAVE A PROTECTABLE INTEREST IN THEIR 
EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTIONS. 
Members of the Retirement System have "inchoate 
contractual rights, which upon completion of conditions precedent 
to retirement and actual retirement, ripen into vested rights." 
Driggs v. Utah State Teachers Retirement Board, 105 Utah 417, 
434, 142 P.2d 657, 664 (1943). Because the sale of Payson City 
Hospital to a private corporation disqualified plaintiffs from 
continued public service, they could not complete those conditions 
precedent to formal "vesting." 
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Nevertheless, the rights of public employees to 
protection of their inchoate interests in employer contributions, 
even those which are not "vested," have long been recognized. For 
example, constitutional law forbids altering the requirements for 
attaining vested benefits after an employee has begun 
participation in the pension plan. See, e.g., Public 
Employees Retirement Board v. Washoe County, 615 P.2d 972, 974 
(Nev. 1980); discussion in Singer v. City of Topeka, 227 Kan. 
356, 607 P.2d 467, 473-75 (1980). 
Professor Corbin recognizes that 
It is clear that the fact that rights are future and 
conditional does not prevent their recognition and 
protection; they are within the protection of the 
constitutional provision against impairment of obligations by 
a State. 
3A Corbin on Contracts § 626, at 10 (1960) (emphasis added) 
(record at 267). See also State v. Allen, 625 P.2d 844 
(Alaska 1981). 
The principle that "nonvested" employees have protectable 
rights was demonstrated in Hansen v. Public Employees 
Retirement System Board of Administrators, 122 Utah 44, 53, 
57, 246 P.2d 591, 595, 597 (1952). In Hansen, a public 
employee without vested pension benefits sought to invalidate the 
Legislature's repeal of the retirement system for the purpose of 
joining the Federal Social Security System. The court denied his 
claim, but primarily because he was provided with a "substantial 
substitute" for his right to continued participation in the 
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repealed system. The "substantial substitute" took the form of a 
paid-up annuity equal to his employee and employer contributions. 
Hansen is very analogous to the instant case. First, 
the facts in Hansen involved the repeal of the entire 
retirement system. Similarly, the facts at bar present the 
dismantling of an entire subset (an employer unit) of the current 
Retirement System. Second, the "substantial substitute" in 
Hansen is exactly the relief sought by the plaintiffs in the 
instant case: return of employer as well as employee 
contributions. 
Therefore, plaintiffs have a protectable interest in 
their deferred wages. The next issue is what form that protection 
should take when an unanticipated mass disqualification of an 
entire workforce makes attaining vested benefits impossible. 
III. FAILURE OF THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT ACT TO CONTEMPLATE 
THE MASS DISQUALIFICATION OF PLAINTIFFS GIVES PLAINTIFFS 
A RIGHT TO RESTITUTION OF THEIR EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTIONS. 
Courts have long held that the intended scope of a 
pension plan's forfeiture provisions determines whether terminated 
employees have a claim for restitution. Most critically, those 
courts have often recognized that express forfeiture provisions, 
which initially appear to limit employees1 rights, were not 
actually drafted in contemplation of operations foreclosures and 
mass terminations. Consequently, those courts have upheld the 
rights of terminated employee classes to restitution. 
The first award of restitution to a class of discharged 
employees came in Longhine v. Bilson, 159 Misc. Ill, 287 
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N.Y.S. 281 (1936) (record at 269)• Employees of a closed down 
mill sued the association which represented the employees of three 
companies and which provided sick benefits to its members. The 
association defended itself on the grounds of a by-law which 
declared forfeited any money paid to the association by a 
terminated employee. The court held that the section was 
intended simply to cover the case of individual members who 
left the employ of the companies either voluntarily or 
involuntarily while such company continued in production and 
in the employment of help. In the case at bar a substantial 
number of members of the defendant association have lost 
employment en masse for reasons beyond their control 
through the discontinuance of operations of the [employer] 
. . . [Wjhen the defendant association came into being 
it was not within the contemplation of the members . . . 
that the mass discharge of all employees through the 
closing down and taking out of production of the mill . . . .  
was such leaving of employment as described in Section 5. 
Id. at 285 (emphasis added). Thus, the Longhine court 
awarded the plaintiffs their prorated share of the association's 
assets. 
In Lucas v. Seagrave Corporation, 277 F. Supp. 338 
(D. Minn. 1967) (record at 275)r the new owner of the employing 
corporation discharged 30 of the 65 participating employees and 
deemed the terminated employees' rights forfeited. Consequently, 
the employees claimed that they had been discharged as a group to 
Seagrave's unjust enrichment. 
The court denied the defendant employer's motion for 
summary judgment and found that it had been unjustly enriched by 
plaintiffs' forfeitures. Seagrave had retained prior tax 
advantages from plaintiffs' participation and had been able to 
refrain from paying plaintiffs their full compensation in cash. 
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"It seems unrealistic to say in this context, as some courts have, 
that the employer received nothing." _ld. at 345. Rigid 
adherence to the pension plan's language was deemed inequitable 
because it did not consider whether the plan intended to place the 
risk of circumstances not contemplated in the actuarial 
assumptions on the employees. In reaching its conclusion, the 
Lucas court placed great reliance on Bernstein, Employee 
Pension Rights When Plants Shut Down, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 952 
(1963). 
This Court should adopt the position taken by the 
Illinois Court of Appeals in Kenneke v. First National Bank of 
Chicago, 105 111. App.3d 630, 434 N.E.2d 495 (1982) (record at 
283); see also prior appeal, 65 111. App.3d 10, 382 N.E.2d 309 
(1978) (record at 294). In Kenneke, the plaintiffs were 
delivery drivers for one publisher and were covered by a 
multiple-employer pension plan. The plaintiffs1 employer ceased 
publishing, dismissed all its drivers, and told them that they had 
not yet acquired any vested benefits. 
The trial court had awarded summary judgment to the 
plan's defendant trustee based on provisions of the collective 
bargaining agreement and pension plan.l' The appellate 
i/ Section 11.2 of the plan provided: 
"Vested Interests. Neither the association, any Employer, 
Participant, nor the Union, nor any member of the Union, . . . 
shall have any right, title or interest in or to the Pension 
Trust Fund, or any part thereof, excepting the right of a 
Participant to benefits as provided hereunder." 
-20-
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court reversed, stating that the plan provisions themselves did 
not "operate to place the full risk of lost pension benefits from 
mass termination on the employees." 434 N.E.2d at 499. Rather 
the intention of the parties had to be ascertained. The thrust of 
the opinion is that, absent a showing by the employer that the 
risk of mass termination had been clearly allocated to the 
employees, a suit for unjust enrichment would succeed. Both of 
the Kenneke opinions relied on the Bernstein article, and the 
Lucas opinion. 434 N.E.2d at 498; 382 N.E.2d at 311. 
The need to protect the inchoate rights of employees to 
their deferred wages (employer contributions) has also been 
recognized by Congress, and efforts to provide such protection 
were recently codified in the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act ("ERISA"). In order to attain the tax benefits under ERISA, a 
pension plan must contain a "partial termination" clause, whereby 
all contributions made on behalf of a group of employees 
terminated en masse become nonforfeitable. See 26 U.S.C. 
S 411(d)(3) (record at 297). The policy of S 411(d)(3), described 
in United Steelworkers of America v. Harris & Sons Steel Co., 
706 F.2d 1289, 1298-99 (3d Cir. 1983) (record at 299), is to 
ensure that "employees will not be deprived of their anticipated 
benefits." Citing Xucas, supra, the Third Circuit stated 
that pension plans which do not actuarially anticipate the sudden 
discharge of a large group of employees may incur a windfall. 706 
F.2d 1298 n. 23. Obviously, the State plan in the present case is 
not governed by ERISA. Nevertheless, the policy behind § 411 
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clearly supports the equitable nature of plaintiffs1 claim for 
restitution. 
Finally, the most basic principles of contract law 
support plaintiffs1 claim for equitable relief. Both the 
Lucas opinion, supra, and the Bernstein thesis rely in 
part on Sections 357(1) and 468(1) of the Restatement [First] of 
Contracts (1932) (record at 317). Section 357 states that when a 
plaintiff has not willfully failed to completely perform a 
condition of his contract,1^ "the plaintiff can get 
judgment for the amount of such benefit in excess of the harm he 
has caused to the defendant." 
Section 468(1) provides that "[e]xcept where a contract 
clearly provides otherwise, a party thereto who has rendered part 
performance for which there is no defined return fixed by 
contract, and who is discharged from further performance by 
impossibility of rendering it, can get judgment for the value of 
past performance rendered." 
1' The relationship of the parties under the 
Utah State Retirement Act is contractual as well as statutory. 
Driggs v. Utah State Teachers Retirement Board, 105 Utah 417, 
422, 434, 142 P.2d 657, 659, 664 (1943); City "of West Jordan v. 
Utah State Retirement Office, Civ. No. C82-6157, Memorandum 
Decision, at 6 (3d Jud. Dist. Ct. Utah July 29, 1983) (record at 
319). The defendant argued below that private pension cases such 
as Lucas, Longhinee and Kenneke are irrelevant in an 
action against a public pension fund. This Court, however, 
specifically rejected that argument in Driggs. 105 Utah at 
427-28, 142 P.2d at 661-62. 
-22-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the present case, plaintiffs are unable to complete 
the performance required to secure pension benefits due to the 
sale of the Hospital; plaintiffs played no role in the decision to 
sell the Hospital and their consequent disqualification. Thus, 
plaintiffs fall squarely within sections 357(1) and 468(1)• 
The above case law, Congressional policy, and learned 
treatises all support restitution of employer contributions for 
employees disqualified en masse. Consequently, upon 
plaintiffs' conclusive showing in the next section that employer 
withdrawal was not contemplated by the Utah State Retirement Act, 
equitable recovery must be granted. 
IV. THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT ACT DID NOT CONTEMPLATE THE MASS 
DISQUALIFICATION OF PLAINTIFFS. 
All of the circumstances surrounding the Act support only 
one conclusion; the 1967 Legislature did not contemplate the 
possibility of withdrawal by an entire employer unit, or the 
divestiture of a public employer unit to a private corporation. 
At the hearing on the parties1 motions for summary judgment, 
defendant admitted that the 1967 Legislature had never 
expressly considered these possibilities. (Statement of 
Proceedings In Which No Transcript Was Made, record at ). 
The language of Utah Code Ann. § 49-10-24, which sets 
forth the options of terminating employees, speaks only in terms 
of individual employees. Nothing in the language suggests that 
the Legislature considered the consequences of an entire work 
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force barred from continued participation by the divestiture of 
their employing unit. 
The historical employee turnover rates prior to the 1967 
Act came from a period of governmental growth, not contraction. 
Unlike the private sector, the possibility of the closure or 
divestment of an employer unit was simply not a serious 
contingency requiring contemplation in 1967. The history of the 
Retirement System supports this view — prior to 1967, no 
employing unit is known to have withdrawn from the Retirement 
System. Deposition of Burt Hunsaker at 33:10-13. Employer 
withdrawal only became an issue around 1977, when Payson City 
Hospital and a couple of other public hospitals were divested. 
The only other relevant history is the very few instances in which 
small units have discontinued employment of the couple of persons 
eligible for coverage. Defendant has characterized those very few 
instances in deposition as follows: 
Q: In your history with the various systems, have there ever 
been occasions when . . . a unit itself has withdrawn 
from the fund and thereby ceased to have coverage under 
it? 
A: Only through having no employees. In other words, they 
have no employees. They've had one or two employees; 
they ceased to have any employees, so there's no 
membership. . . . I'm referring to a small city that 
might have an employee on full-time and they've gone to 
part-time or elected positions where they haven't been 
covered. 
Deposition of Burt Hunsaker at 32:8-19. Thus, prior to the Payson 
City Hospital's divestiture, there was never any reason to 
contemplate and provide for mass termination. 
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Even more compelling is Mr. Hunsakerfs testimony 
regarding the Legislative process at the time of enactment: 
Q: . . . was it ever brought up [by the Retirement Office] 
that an entire unit might withdraw from the system? 
A: In dealing with the legislature? 
Q: Yes. 
A: No. 
Deposition of Burt Hunsaker at 34:18-23. Even defendant's own 
counsel's questions establish the absence of legislative 
consideration: 
Q. . . . is there any provision in the law for withdrawing 
of an employer unit? 
A. No, that's what created the problem. 
Deposition of Burt Hunsaker at 66:16-18.1/ 
Thus, the only known circumstances concerning the 
legislative intent show that (1) there was no historical 
experience to prompt legislative contemplation of mass 
i7 The new S 49-10-ll(3)-(4) forbids employer 
withdrawal except as permitted by the Retirement Board and subject 
to S 49-10-24. That section, however, became effective March 3, 
1983. 1983 Utah Laws Ch. 224, SS 6, 12. Even the new 
provision, however, does not appear to address undeniable de 
facto withdrawal when a public entity is divested and its 
employees become ineligible for continued participation. 
Furthermore, the amendments to § 49-10-11 do not retroactively 
affect appellants' action. Utah Code Ann. S 68-3-3. 
Finally, the incorporation of S 49-10-24 by § 49-10-11(4) 
is limited to employing units that began participation pursuant to 
S 49-10-11(3). Payson City Hospital, however, was admitted 
pursuant to S 49-10-3(h) and not S 49-10-11(3). Thus, the 
legislature has still not provided for withdrawal under the 
circumstances of this case. 
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termination, (2) no known legislative discussion of the 
possibility of mass termination was held, and (3) the statutory 
language itself does not suggest any contemplation of mass 
termination or employer withdrawal. As cases such as Kenneke, 
Lucas, and Longhine exemplify, failure to consider mass 
termination is common, even in the private sector where such a 
risk is much more pervasive. Accord Bernstein, Employee 
Pension Rights When Plants Shut Down, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 952 
(1963)5/. 
CONCLUSION: PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO RESTITUTION AS A 
MATTER OF LAW 
The employer contributions made by Payson City Hospital 
were compensation for plaintiffs1 services in the form of deferred 
±' Three justices of the United States Supreme 
Court adopted the Bernstein article and found that "Pension plans 
normally do not make provision to protect the interests of 
employees . . . who are terminated because an employer closes one 
of his plants. . . . For unlike discharges for inadequate job 
performance, which may reasonably be foreseen, the closure of a 
plant is a contingency outside the range of normal expectations of 
both employer and employee." Allied Stuctural Steel Co. v. 
Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 253 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, 
J.J., dissenting) (majority holding retroactive state minimum 
funding law violated contract clause of U.S. Constitution) (record 
at 337). Although these justices were speaking in dissent, the 
issue and holding in Spannaus were quite distinct from the 
case at bar. 
See also Note, A Reappraisal of the Private 
Pension System, 57 Cornell L. Rev. 278 (1972); Levin, 
Proposals to Eliminate Inequitable Loss of Pension Benefits, 
15 Vill. L. Rev. 527 (1970); Note, Pension Plans and the Rights 
of the Retired Worker, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 909 (1970); Note, 
Employees1 Rights To"~Employer Contributed Pension Benefits 
After A Plant Shutdown, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 807. 
-26-
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
wages; moreover, plaintiffs have protectable rights in those 
employer contributions whether or not they attained "vested 
benefits.ff As a matter of law, where mass termination was not 
contemplated at the time the forfeiture terms of a pension plan 
were established, terminated employees are excused from the 
vesting schedule and have a right to restitution for employer 
contributions. 
Accordingly, plaintiffs are entitled to a reversal of the 
district court's Order granting summary judgment to defendant, and 
denying plaintiffs1 motion for partial summary judgment. The 
district court should be directed to enter an order (1) that the 
forefeiture provisions of the Act, including § 42-10-24, are not 
applicable to the plaintiffs, (2) that the Utah State Retirement 
Fund, administered by the defendant, has been unjustly enriched, 
and (3) that plaintiffs are entitled to restitution. The actual 
amount of recovery is subject to subsequent determination at trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /7</^ v day of June, 1985. 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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A - l 
49-10-24. Options of terminating employee — Withdrawal of accu-
mulated contributions — Inactive membership. If a member shall for 
any cause, except retirement, permanent or temporary disability or death, 
cease to be employed in covered services for an employer he may: 
(a) By written request directed to the retirement office receive a refund 
of all his accumulated contributions, less a withdrawal fee the amount of 
which the retirement board shall establish by regulation for the purpose 
of reimbursing its administrative fund for the cost entailed by said with-
drawal. In the event of such election, a terminating employee upon later 
re-employment by an employer under the provisions of this act, unless he 
redeposits his refund as herein permitted, shall be treated as a new 
employee and his service history and benefit rights shall then be based 
upon current services from the date of said re-employment in covered ser-
vices. 
(b) Leave his account in the fund intact. In the event of such election, 
a terminating employee shall retain status as a member of the system, 
excepting for the lack of contributions paid into the fund by him or on 
his behalf. In the event of his re-employment by an employer for services 
covered by this act, his service history and benefit rights shall be based 
upon the prior service credit and current service credit accredited to him 
at the time of his most recent termination of employment, as well as upon 
the current service credit that he acquires as the result of his 
re-employment. 
Upon the attainment of retirement age, an inactive member shall have 
the same rights to receive retirement benefits, if eligible therefor, as any 
active employee member. 
4 
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A-2 
Stanford B. Owen, A2495 
jjAttorney for Plaintiffs 
•Robert Palmer Rees 
Law Clerk Appointed to Represent 
!! Plaintiffs 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARK L. JOHNSON and CAROL ANN 
NIELSON, on behalf of themselves 
jand as representatives of all 
others similarly situated, 
i 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
1 I 
'UTAH STATE RETIREMENT OFFICE, a 
Utah State Agency, 
!i 
j! Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS FOR 
WHICH NO TRANSCRIPT WAS MADE 
Civil No, C78-6162 
(Hone James S. Sawaya) 
Appeal No. 
?! Pursuant to Utah R. App. p. 11(g), Mark L. Johnson and 
l! 
Carol Ann Nielson, et al., plaintiffs-appellants in the 
::above-captioned matter submit the following statement of the 
January 28, 1985 hearing, held without a court reporter, on the 
it 
parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. 
This statement is based upon the recollection of Stanford 
B. Owen, counsel of record for the plaintiffs, and Robert Palmer 
Rees, law clerk appointed by court order to represent the 
LAW OFFICES 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A-3 
jplaintif fs. This statement is limited to matters raised at the 
.hearing which are not otherwise sufficiently covered in the 
Iparties1 memoranda of points and authorities submitted before the 
^hearing. • «. 
il 
1 
j| 1. The January 28, 1985 hearing was scheduled by 
plaintiffs to consider plaintiffs1 motion for partial summary 
judgment. Plaintiffs were orally advised by defendant that a 
cross-motion for summary judgment might be made orally at the 
scheduled hearing. 
; 2. Before plaintiffs presented their oral argument, 
il 
counsel for the defendant made an oral cross-motion for summary 
; i 
|}judgment. Defendant's counsel stated that the cross-motion was 
''appropriate because no material facts were in dispute. The Court 
.received defendant's motion. 
•! 
3. Plaintiffs began their oral argument by observing 
1
 that defendant had indicated no material facts were in dispute 
I I 
when making its oral motion; plaintiffs further noted that 
^defendant's memorandum of points and authorities did not properly 
raise any material factual issue. Plaintiffs stated that they 
would therefore not address any factual issues unless raised by 
i ! 
the defendant in oral argument. 
I : 
4. After summarizing the Preliminary Factual Statement 
from plaintiffs' memorandum in support, plaintiffs made their 
legal argument based on the four-part analysis presented in their 
memorandum. 
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5. During their initial argument, plaintiffs withdrew 
ft 
ijtheir citation to Cal. Gov. Code §§ 20563, 20564 (West) (appended 
Ito plaintiffs' memorandum as Appendix L) because that section does 
not, as erroneously first read, refer to employer contributions. 
ii 
!! 6. In defendant's oral argument, defendant admitted that 
• i 
the 1967 Utah Legislature had not expressly considered the 
: I 
prospect of an employer unit withdrawing from the Utah State 
Retirement System, or the possibility of divestiture of a public 
employer unit to a private corporation. Defendant then proceeded 
with the legal arguments presented in its memorandum in opposition. 
j! 7. In rebuttal, plaintiffs clarified that they were not 
'Iraising the constitutional arguments from their complaint in their 
•Imotion for partial summary judgment. 
ji DATED this P day of VlcL'iAsf-^^ , 1985. 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
BySl^^2^ §ta'irfbrd B. Owen 
Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f s 
Mark A. Madsen 
Attorney for Defendant 
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